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not possible here, at least a brief explanation is required.
Not just any benefit is a right; only those benefits to which one is entitled are, or rather may be, rights. Not even all benefits that another person is obliged to render to one are one's rights. For example, A may be obliged to confer a benefit on B out of considerations of charity, without B having a right to that benefit. Although I am morally obliged to aid the needy, a particular destitute person does not, ipso facto, have a right to my money or even a right to assistance from me. I may be obliged to aid him, but he is not entitled to that aid from me; i.e., he does not have a right to it from me.
The distinction between duty and obligation, the right thing to do, and entitlement, i.e., rights, is crucial. We speak of right in both instances but in quite different senses, which need to be kept distinct.
Elsewhere (Donnelly 1980 Another way to mark these two senses is by the verbs with which they are used. When we talk of righteousness, the verb characteristically used is to be: It is right for you to help her; What is right here?; It wouldn't be right to leave now. However, when we talk of rights, of entitlements, to be is rarely if ever used. Instead we talk of having or holding rights, and various ways of putting rights to use, all of which are based on possession of that right. Thus we might distinguish these two senses of right as right in the sense of what is right (or right in the sense of being right) and right in the sense of having a right.2
Having a right places one in a protected position. To violate someone's right is not merely to fail to do what is right but also to commit a special and important personal offense against the rightholder by failing to give him his due, that to which he is entitled. To violate a right goes well beyond merely falling short of some high moral standard.
Furthermore, rights, especially basic rights, have a special priority where they come into conflict with other action-justifying principles. This is 2This way of making the distinction seems preferable because, for example, when one says "It is right to do x for him," one means right in the sense of 'right that,' whereas when one says "I have a right that you do this for me," the sense intended is right in the sense of right to. In fact, one of the basic purposes of rights would seem to be to insulate right-holders from claims based on such principles, which otherwise would be not only appropriate but decisive reasons for political and even individual action. However, this priority is only prima facie. Rights are defeasible; i.e., in particular cases they may be justifiably overriden by other rights, considerations of right in the sense of what is right, necessity, scarcity, or some other principle. Nonetheless, it is essential to rights that they have this special status of taking priority over all but the most pressing non-rights demands and interests.
One It is clear that the Western tradition of natural 3Claim theories of rights (most notably Feinberg, 1980) usually are distinguished from, and viewed as incompatible with, entitlement theories such as the one presented here. However, a claim theory can be more profitably seen as a complementary approach that highlights different parts of the practice of rights. A crucial element of being entitled to something is being in a position to make claims. However, the claim theorist tends to ignore the fact that there are other sorts of claims than claims to rights. What distinguishes and grounds claims to rights is the special entitlement of the rightholder.
'Discretionary exercise of rights is crucial. The bestknown account that stresses discretionary control is Hart, 1973 . Whether all rights share this feature is debatable-e.g., discretionary control of an inalienable right would be in some way limited-but in most standard cases it is central to the rights-based relationship that exists between right-holder and duty-bearer. or human rights, which goes back at least to Locke, has conceived of human rights in this way.' In fact it is precisely this conception that distinguishes this modern tradition from the Greek, medieval, and Stoic natural law theories and competing modern theories such as utilitarianism.' The guarantees of life, liberty, and property (and increasingly, since the late eighteenth century, beginning with Paine, guarantees of such rights as education and social security) are treated as more than merely right in the sense of what is right, more than simply the righteous demands of God, morality, conscience, or social policy. Rather, they are viewed as the rights of man, as human rights.
Here we will take this tradition to be stipulative of the meaning of human rights. At the very least, this is the sense present in the classic documents and philosophical defenses, as well as in ordinary usage. For our purposes this usage must suffice.
Of course human rights are but one type of rights, namely the rights one holds by virtue of being a person. Not all rights held by human beings are human rights. Legal, contractual, promissory, and constitutional rights are held by human beings without their being necessarily human rights; that is, they are rights of persons without being among the rights of man.
Human rights are conceived as naturally inhering in the human person. They are neither granted by the state nor are they the result of one's actions. In Hart's (1955) well-known categorization, they are general rights, rights that 51 use the two terms more or less interchangably, despite subtle differences in connotation. Defending such a usage, though, is beyond our scope here. However, compare Beitz (1979 There is also a strong and quite essential implication that human rights, as a particularly important class of rights, take priority over all but the most serious non-rights demands. If rights in general are trumps, human rights are the honor cards in the suit.
Sometimes this view is expressed in the claim that human rights are absolute. However, this is taking the point too far. For example, an absolute right to liberty would make unjustified even the jailing of criminals. Nonetheless, there are very few circumstances in which human rights might be justifiably overridden. Human rights are relatively absolute, at least in part because their natural and inalienable character is based largely on the attributes and potentials they protect, which are essential to a meaningful and fully human life.
Finally, human rights are conceived as being held primarily in relation to society and particularly to society in the form of the state. As the natural rights of persons, they are seen as logically and morally to take precedence over the rights of the state and society, which are viewed as major contributors to the realization of these rights but also the greatest potential violators of basic human rights.
Non-Western Political Cultures and Human Rights
Having sketched this conceptual benchmark, let us look briefly at the ways in which several traditional cultures and one modern non-Western society have approached the issues we consider in terms of human rights, i.e., the social and political ideals by which these cultures aspire to realize human dignity. In each case I will show that the substantive issues discussed today in terms of human rights, such as life, speech, religion, work, health, and education, are handled almost entirely in terms of duties that are neither derivative from nor correlative to rights, or at least not human rights. These societies recognize that guarantees in these areas are essential to a fully human life and the realization of inherent human dignity. However, when we look at these alleged human rights, we find that virtually all of them are only duties of rulers and individuals, not rights held by anyone. The scriptural passages cited as establishing a right to protection of life in fact are divine injunctions not to kill and to consider life as inviolable. Likewise, the right to justice proves to be instead a duty of rulers to establish justice, whereas the right to freedom is merely a duty not to enslave unjustly. In fact, economic rights turn out to be duties to earn a living and to help to provide for the needy, whereas the right to freedom of expression actually is an obligation to speak the truth; i.e., the right is not even an obligation of others but an obligation of the alleged rightholder! Although Moslems are regularly and forcefully enjoined to treat their fellow men with respect and dignity, the bases for these injunc- 'Piscatori (1980) In other words, in Islam, in the realm of human rights (read human dignity), what really matters is duty rather than rights, and whatever rights do exist are a consequence of one's status or actions, not one's nature.
There can be little objection to claims that in Islam "it is the state's duty to enhance human dignity and alleviate conditions that hinder individuals in their efforts to achieve happiness" (Said 1980, p. 87). It may even be plausible to argue that "there is no aspect of human need but Islam, in its ethical, social and liturgical precepts, has made provision for it" (Tabandeh 1970, p. 10). Without a doubt the social and political precepts of Islam reflect a strong concern for human good and human dignity, but although such concern is important in itself and would appear to be a prerequisite for human rights notions, it is in no way equivalent to a concern for, or a recognition of, human rights.
Human There are many bases on which a government might be limited-divine commandment, human rights, legal rights, and extra-legal checks such as a balance of power, to name a few. Simply having a limited government does not in any way entail that one has human rights. Yet Wai and others base their arguments on little more than a demonstration of the existence of limited government." "There is no point in belaboring the concern for rights, democratic institutions, and rule of law in traditional African politics" (Wai 1980, p. 117) . To this we can only add that it is particularly pointless in a discussion of human rights, given the form such concerns took. Even in the many cases where Africans had personal rights vis-A-vis their government, those rights were not based on one's humanity per se but on membership in the community, status, or some other ascriptive characteristic.
Asmarom Legesse argues along similar lines that "many studies have been carried out that suggest that distributive justice, in the economic and political spheres, is the cardinal ethical principle that is shared by most Africans" (1980, p. 127). This is quite true. It is also, once again, irrelevant.
Distributive justice and human rights are quite different concepts. One might have a theory or conception of distributive justice based on human rights, but one might as easily base it on some other principle. Plato, Burke, and Bentham all had theories of distributive justice, yet no one would ever think to suggest that they advocated human rights. Although giving to each his own (distributive justice) will involve giving a person that to which he is entitled (his rights), unless the definition of one's own takes place in terms of that to which one is entitled simply as a human being, the rights in question will not be human rights. In African societies, rights were assigned on the basis of communal membership, family, status, or achievement.
As with human rights in Islam, we see here an attempt to establish that the differences with the West lie only in the words used, not the concepts. "Different societies formulate their conception of human rights in diverse cultural idioms" (Legesse 1980, p. 124 One wonders how the Chinese managed to claim rights without the language to make such claims. Likewise, the assertion that basic human rights were enjoyed seems implausible. Did the Chinese have these rights, exercise them, assert them, or only enjoy them? One suspects the latter, in which case Lo's claim collapses, because of the confusion between enjoying a benefit and having a right. Simply because acts that we would say involved violations of human rights were not considered permissible does not necessarily entail that people were viewed as having human rights.
Lo claims that "the idea of human rights developed very early in China" and he examines one particular human right, the right to revolt, which "was repeatedly expressed in Chinese history" (1949, pp. 186-87). However, the passages he quotes from the classic texts show only that the ruler "has a duty to heaven to take care of the interests of the people." Thus the only particular human right he advances proves not to be a right at all, for a duty of the ruler to heaven is quite a different matter from a right of the people vis-d-vis the ruler.
Shao-Chuan Leng also argues that "Chinese political theory sanctioned the people's revolts against oppressive rulers" (1980, p. 84). However, he fails to show that this sanction was based on human rights. Instead he simply assumes that democracy, in a very loose sense of the term, can be equated with human rights (1980, pp. 82-85). For example, after showing the elitist, hierarchical, and station-based character of traditional Chinese social relations and Confucian political and social philosophy, Leng adds that "there were also democratic traits in Chinese civilization," apparently taking this to be a demonstration of the existence of the concept of human rights (1980, p. 82). We have already discussed this conceptual error above.
As before, the problem lies in a confusion of ethical and political duties with human rights.
Undeniably there were elaborate duties imposed on rulers. Obligation, though, is only one side of a rights-based relationship. In itself, it does not even suggest, let alone establish, the existence of rights on the part of those in whose interests one is obliged to act. Lo notes that traditional Chinese doctrine is expressed almost entirely in terms of duties of rulers. However, he refers to this only as a "different approach to the problem of human rights" (1949, p. 188) . In fact, it is an approach to the problem of human dignity which involves no human rights.
Moving from China to India, particularly traditional Hindu India, one would imagine that there would be no question about human rights being present, given the central place of the caste system. For example, Ralph Buultjens captures nicely the essential implications of the caste system for human rights.
The essential feature of caste was the assumption that there are fundamental and unchangeable differences in the status and nature of human beings.'4 These differences make it necessary for people to be governed by different norms of behavior appropriate to their station in life.... Central to the Soviet approach is the fusion of '4In fact, these differences are so extreme that it would appear that the notion of the human person, which is so central to the concept of human rights, is quite foreign to such a way of thinking. However, these duties, which we certainly do recognize, are not conceived of as arising from the possession of rights, or rather, not from one's own rights. The duty to respect another person's liberty is imposed on me by his right to liberty, not mine, and he has such a right not because I have a right to liberty but as the result of a particular pattern of distribution of rights. Likewise, I can have a right to work or a right to health care without being under an obligation, as a result of that right, to work for, or to contribute to, the welfare of the community. It may be an unjust or immoral society which gives me such rights without these duties, but that is another matter altogether.
If the logic of rights does not render rights and duties coincident, the only way I can see to accomplish this is to treat rights as social grants. If A (society), having a right to, or control of, x (jobs), transfers x to B (citizens), conditional on B accepting certain parallel or reciprocal duties (work), the right to x would be simultaneously a duty, as a result of the manner in which the right was invested.
Such a transfer may be seen to benefit both parties to the transaction and thus is easily defended. The individual in this situation would benefit from the guaranteed access to suitable rewarding work, whereas society would benefit if all ablebodied citizens worked. The individual would, as a result of the transaction, have a right to a job, coupled with a non-rights-based duty to work, whereas the state would have a rights-based duty to provide jobs and a (contractual?) right to have citizens work in a socially productive field.
Such an analysis is particularly attractive because it is consistent with the basic philosophical and ideological precepts of the Soviet system. The focus is unambiguously social, and the state is given prominence of place, with the individual conceptualized as not actually subsidiary to the state but capable of realization only in his social capacity. This analysis also places the emphasis, as the Soviets always do, on objective and concrete rights, which the individual enjoys only A full system of such rights would indeed involve the organic unity of rights and duties, and such a system would be full of rights, in the sense of having a right. However, human rights would be entirely absent, for human rights are not grants, either conditional or unconditional, of state or society, but are inherent to man.
Even in the Constitution, the Soviets rather clearly treat rights as contingent on the performance of duties; in Article 59, which states that "the exercise of rights and liberties is inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties," and in Article 50, where civil rights are held to be granted "in accordance with the people's interests and for the purpose of strengthening and developing the socialist system." As one Soviet commentator has tellingly put it, "the significance and worth of each person are determined by the way he exercises his rights and performs his duties" (Egorov 1979 , p. 36).
Economic and social rights as well as civil and political rights are treated as contingent and are forfeited when the duties that accompany them are not discharged. For example, despite the apparently unqualified character of the right to work mentioned in Article 40, jobs in their fields are regularly denied dissidents and Jewish activists, in accordance with Soviet law and administrative practice, on the grounds of the individuals having failed to discharge their social duties. The right to education, according to Article 45, "is ensured by the free nature of all types of education." Nonetheless, emigres may be required to buy back this "free" education as a legal condition of exit.
Admittedly, any right, even a basic right, has its limits which are specified by law. For example, in this country the right to freedom of speech is limited by laws of slander and libel and by the general requirement that the right not be exercised so as wrecklessly to endanger others such as by yelling "Fire!" in a crowded theater. However, one's possession and exercise of a basic human right like the right to freedom of speech are not conditional on accepting either these limits or some parallel duty.
For example, the slanderer is fined for the damage done and yet continues to be able to exercise his right to freedom of speech. As a human or constitutional right in this country, the right to freedom of speech is conceived to be inherent to the individual and independent of his merit or the discharge of civic responsibilities. Writing from an Islamic perspective, Ahmad Yamani likewise argues that the West "is so overzealous in its defense of the individual's freedom, rights and dignity, that it overlooks the acts of some individuals in exercising such rights in a way that jeopardizes the community" (1968, p. 15).
Throughout the Third World-and for the sake of simplicity and ease of exposition we will focus on the developing Third World in what followsthis general orientation seems to be overwhelmingly predominant. The question, though, is what conclusions are to be drawn from the undeniable fact of such differences and what, as a practical matter, ought to be done about human rights in the face of such fundamental divergences.
Legesse, like many others, argues that "any system of ideas that claims to be universal must contain critical elements in its fabric that are avowedly of African, Latin American or Asian derivation" (1980, p. 123).21 In practice this would mean the inclusion of group or peoples' rights along with individual human rights. However, the issues at stake in such a move demand a substantive, rather than a geographical, argument.
Human rights, as we have been discussing them, are held by individuals and are exercised primarily in relation to society, usually in the person of the state, against which they are most characteristically claimed.22 Peoples' rights, though, are held by society (again, usually in the form of the state) and directed against the individual (or other states) in their operation. If social rights and duties are both extensive and take priority over individual rights, as for example in the USSR, human rights are likely to be largely formal in practice. In such circumstances, although one might be said to have a human right, in those instances in which one would be inclined to assert or claim it, namely where the right is threatened, 2"It is ironic that those most attuned to Western neocolonialism and who would correctly reject with contempt an argument that an idea was correct or even applicable because of its Western origin, show the same basic error in such a geopolitical approach to the question of the truth, defensibility, or utility of the (Western) concept of human rights.
"The exceptions to this, in the realm of internationally recognized human rights, represent a clear and rather explicit redefinition of the concept along the lines approved of in Legesse's argument. This is particularly evident in the case of the right to self-determination, which is included in the Covenants but not the Universal Declaration, and in the emerging "third generation" of human rights, such as the rights to peace and development (see, e.g., UN documents number E/CN.4/1334 and HR/GENEVA/1980/BP.1-4 and Alston 1980).
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The American Political Science Review Vol. 76 challenged, violated, or frustrated, it would be largely useless. One might be said to have the right, but it would not serve as much of a trump, for where one would be likely to want to claim it, the claim would be rather easily overridden by the rights of society and associated individual duties. In fact, as a practical matter, one would be able to enjoy the right only at the discretion of the state, and yet the state would not be violating one's rights in denying that enjoyment. This approach looks much more like being granted a benefit than having a right. In other words, it would appear as if human rights could be combined with peoples' rights in any substantial way only with great risk to their essential character.
In any case, having that kind of a human right would be rather different from having a human right as that has been interpreted until now. Restoring the balance between the individual and society in this fashion thus comes dangerously close to destroying or denying human rights as they have been understood. Therefore, incorporating Third World views would be likely to have major costs for human rights.
Such costs may or may not be justified. A society which regularly balanced human rights against the rights of society may or may not be preferable to one based on a Western concept of human rights. However, the issue must be addressed in substantive terms, not simply on the basis of anthropological and historical differences.
Here is not the place to assess the relative merits of claims of human and peoples' rights. However, I do want to suggest that writers like Legesse seem to base their proposals on a rather wistful social vision of limited applicability to contemporary circumstances and aspirations.
The social model they seem to have in mind is the small community based on groupings of extended families, the type of community so characteristic of traditional societies, both Western and non-Western. In particular, a relatively decentralized, non-bureaucratic, communitarian society seems to be the ideal.
In such a society, the individual lacks many, if not most, of the rights that are so highly valued in the liberal democratic state. However, he has a secure and significant place in his society and has available a wide range of intense personal and social relationships which provide him important material and non-material support. He also has available regularized social protections of many of the values and interests which in the West are protected through individual human and legal rights. One might argue that introducing individual rights would diminish his prospects for achieving a dignified life worthy of a human being. In any case, such a society is undeniably morally defensible, is in many ways quite attractive, and can be said to protect basic human dignity.
Along somewhat different lines, one might argue that only such a society is defensible in conditions of extreme scarcity (Keenan 1980, pp. 80ff). If extremely limited resources or environmental severity make survival precarious, the individual, in the absence of the close-knit community whose interests take priority, would be doomed to death, if only through accident or disease. Certainly our anthropological evidence suggests that such a communitarian solution appears to be natural to most peoples.
However, if we remove the pressures of necessity and, even more importantly, if we remove the social support and protection provided to the individual by the traditional community, things appear in a different light. Now it would be difficult to justify the continued absence of individual human rights while still having a system that could be said to protect and give prominence to human dignity, in any plausible sense of that term.
Westernization, modernization, development, and underdevelopment-the dominant contemporary social and economic forces-have in fact severed the individual from the small, supportive community. Economic, social, and cultural intrusions into, and disruptions of, the traditional community have removed the support and protection which would "justify" or "compensate for" the absence of individual human rights. These intrusions have created a largely isolated individual who is forced to go it alone against social, economic, and political forces that far too often appear to be aggressive and oppressive. Society, which once protected his dignity and provided him with an important place in the world, now appears, in the form of the modern state, the modern economy, and the modern city, as an alien power that assaults his dignity and that of his family.
In such circumstances, human rights appear as the natural response to changing conditions, a logical and necessary evolution of the means for realizing human dignity. The individual needs the protection of individual rights, barring the implausible, and generally undesired, reemergence of the traditional order. And given the power of modern institutions and the demonstrated inclinations of the individuals and groups that control them, not just any type of individual rights will do, but only rights with the moral force and range of universal human rights. In Marxist terms, the bourgeois economic revolution brings with it the bourgeois political revolution and bourgeois rights; capitalism and industrialization bring in their wake natural or human rights, which represent a major advance in the protection of human dignity in such circumstances.
From this perspective, then, the individualism of human rights appears as a response to objective conditions. Therefore, to rail against the individualism of human rights in the absence of an alternative solution to the very real problems of protecting the individual and human dignity, is at best utopian or shortsighted. This is admittedly only a functional, rather than a moral, defense of human rights, and a defense based on a limited, largely Western, historical experience. Nonetheless, it does suggest that serious consideration be given to the argument that the underlying concerns and needs in the area of human rights and human dignity are, for objective, historical reasons, essentially the same today in the Third World as they were two or three centuries ago in England and France. This requires, though, that we put aside questions of the origins of concepts, practices, and institutions-not to mention the awarding of credit or praise for discovering them-and focus instead on their applicability to the problems we face today in protecting and realizing human dignity. The real question is whether the concept of human rights has contemporary relevance outside the West.
The Relevance of Human Rights
The claim that the Western concept of human rights is in some way irrelevant to Third World needs is a recurrent theme in the contemporary literature. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab present an extreme version of this argument. They write that "it is evident that in most states in the world, human rights as defined by the West are rejected or, more accurately, are meaningless" (1980, p. 13) and refer to the Western concept as "inapplicable," "of limited validity" and "irrelevant" (1980, pp. 13, 8, 9). These are strong claims. I shall argue that for the most part they are not justified.
Admittedly, human rights are likely to appear to be foreign to the average person in most developing countries. People in these countries may even have the greatest difficulty comprehending what is meant by human rights. However, this is no more evidence that human rights are meaningless than similar difficulties in comprehension are evidence that dharma or tao are meaningless in Iowa or that anti-proton or neutrino telescope are meaningless most everywhere. Pollis and Schwab simply confuse meaning with understanding.
Inapplicable or irrelevant seem closer to what they have in mind. However, even these terms are ambiguous, having at least three important possible interpretations: that human rights objectively have no applicability; that their applicability is not recognized; or that the applicability of human rights is (or would be) rejected. Clearly the differences among these three senses are crucial, and all of them raise serious problems.
Determining the objective relevance of human rights would be a difficult matter. However, it is clear that a simple demonstration that most people in a country have been, and continue to be, unaware of the concept, or that they have adopted alternative mechanisms for realizing human dignity, will not establish that human rights are (objectively) irrelevant. A head count might be part of such a determination, although even that is not obvious. However, it certainly would not be definitive. A positive, substantive, probably even empirical argument would be necessary to establish objective inapplicability.
The two subjective senses of irrelevant raise problems of a different sort. For example, we are forced to ask what weight we ought to give to such subjective decisions and preferences. Also, we need to determine who is to speak for the society, and how, which is especially important given the basic political implications of such decisions.
In answering such questions, we find ourselves faced with at least partially competing intuitions. We must recognize the validity of claims of traditional values and institutions, as well as the rights of modern nations and states to choose their own destiny. At the same time, though, we feel a need to keep these choices constrained within acceptable bounds and reject an anything-goes attitude.
Certainly Louis XIV found the revolutionary rights of man to be inappropriate-and today's historians seem to be not altogether certain that the majority of his subjects, especially those outside of Paris, did not agree with him. More recently, "Emperor" Bokassa and Idi Amin have found human rights concerns to be irrelevant while Pol Pot and his successors alike have determined that human rights are inappropriate to Cambodia's needs and interests. Although there is widespread agreement that these men were and are wrong in their judgments, elucidating the bases for such a conclusion and then applying the resulting principles to less extreme cases raises serious difficulties.
We might begin by suggesting that extreme cases such as Amin or Bokassa can be criticized on the basis of the concept of human dignity alone. The practices of such regimes evidence not an alternative conception of human dignity but the denial of the very concept. For example, killing schoolchildren who protest school rules simply is incompatible with any and all plausible conceptions of human dignity. Although claims of human rights would substantially increase the force of our condemnations of these regimes, we can both forcefully and appropriately condemn such practices on the basis of the concept of human dignity alone.
Problems arise, though, when we are faced in- . 1, 14-17) . However, lowest-common-denominator and compromise approaches seem to assume: (1) that the claim of human rights advocates and theorists that human rights are universal rights is false; and (2) that the human rights approach is not a better one and therefore does not deserve to be more widely or even universally applied. Neither of these assumptions seems obvious, or even correct.
If we are to try to assess whether human rights is a better way to approach human dignity and organize a society, we need to ask, "Better for what?" This is a question of means, not ends. Human rights are not ends in themselves; or rather they are not entirely ends in themselves. Among other things, as we have seen, they are means to realize human dignity. To the extent that they have instrumental value we can, in principle at least, assess their merits largely empirically. I would suggest that for most of the goals of the developing countries, as defined by these countries themselves, human rights are as effective or more effective than either traditional approaches or modern non-human rights strategies.
For example, if our concern is with the realization of human dignity, one could argue, along the lines suggested above, that the conditions created by modernization render the individual too vulnerable in the absence of human rights. If the concern is with development and social justice, a strong case might be made that the recognition and protection of human rights will increase participation and therefore popular support and productivity, open up lines of communication between people and government (thus providing greater efficiency and important checks against corruption and mismanagement), spur the provision of basic services through the recognition of economic and social rights, and provide to dispossessed groups regular and important channels for demanding redress. If one is concerned with stability, an argument might be advanced that a regime that violates or does not recognize basic human rights engenders destabilizing opposition, especially where the government is weak and does not have at its disposal substantial, effective modern mechanisms of political repression.
Certainly such suggestions are not even outlines of the arguments that would be necessary to establish such conclusions. However, I think they show that we cannot simply assume that other strategies are as good or as valid merely because they are widely advocated. Furthermore, they suggest most clearly the need to move beyond the level of demonstrating differences in values, which is the level of most current discussion, to assessing the relative merits of competing approaches which, as we have suggested, can be done largely empirically in many instances.
The case against the other assumption of those who would approach differences in ways to realize human dignity by compromise or seeking a lowest common denominator, namely the assumption that human rights are not in fact universal rights, would have to be largely normative. The issue involved here is whether there are human rights, since non-universal human rights simply would not be human rights as they have been conceived even in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The compromise approach thus involves abandoning human rights as we have understood them largely without even presenting arguments.
At the very least it must be noted in response that if we take seriously the idea of human rights, we must recognize them as both a historical product and of universal validity. As the rights of man, as human rights, they cannot be treated as merely a historical product without destroying the concept. In fact, the idea of human rights would even seem to demand of us a concern for their realization universally, even though we know that the concept was first formulated and institutionalized in a particular civilization at a particular time. Such a demand is a difficult one to be sure, but it is one that seems unavoidable if we are not to renounce human rights in the name of avoiding cultural neo-imperialism. And it is not much more difficult than taking seriously any major moral claim, which we know arises out of values that are genetically contingent but which by their very nature must be taken to apply universally or nearly universally.
However, even if, for the sake of argument, we grant the assumption that human rights are not universal, the most important result will be to increase the importance of the questions of relevance and instrumental value we have just discussed. Simply establishing that human rights are not universal would not show that an alternative or competing approach to human dignity is necessarily defensible, let alone preferable. Rather, we would be left with several competing approaches which, unless we accept the crudest sort of valuerelativism (e.g., emotivism), not only can but must be evaluated comparatively.
The differences between Western and nonWestern approaches to human dignity certainly are large. In fact, one of my major aims here has been to show that they are far greater than seems to be generally recognized in the contemporary literature. However, these differences do not, in themselves, entail the necessity of a laissez faire approach. Neither do they establish the substantive merits of any particular approach, let alone the inferiority of the Western human rights approach.
Conclusion
The belief that there are important practical consequences to the ways in which we think and talk about human rights and human dignity underlies the foregoing analysis, which has attempted to show that there are important differences in approach and that these differences can influence political practice in significant ways. If the alternative approaches to human dignity we have been discussing are accepted as legitimate conceptions of human rights, the practice of human rights is likely to suffer. For example, not only would it become easier for a repressive regime to cloak itself in the mantle of human rights while actually violating them, thereby turning "human rights" into an instrument of oppression rather than liberation, but in those countries with established human rights practices, the conceptual bases of the concept are likely to be eroded, thereby weakening the practice.
Of course, there is nothing inherent in the concept of human rights which assures that it won't, let alone shouldn't, change or evolve. Strong arguments can even be made that it would be desirable to reduce or minimize the place of human rights in political doctrine and practice, or even to replace human rights with entirely different organizing principles.
However, such arguments rarely are made today. Instead, human rights is used as roughly equivalent to "our approach to human dignity" and just about anything that is good or highly valued is transformed into a human right.
As a result, the distinctive and distinctly valuable aspects of a human rights approach are insidiously eroded. Human rights thus are attacked through their apparent advocacy in a covert linguistic operation which is not only particularly difficult to handle but which frustrates rather than encourages the discussion demanded byissues of such importance. Pressing the distinction between human rights and human dignity should not only clarify what is at stake but should improve the general level of discussion and perhaps even improve political practice. Admittedly, it is probably utopian to expect that any of this analysis will have a real effect in more than a handful of instances. Nevertheless, it seems mandatory to perpetuate the discussion if for no other reason than to preserve the human rights approach as a distinctive option; if we lose the concept, we stand in greater danger of losing the practice as well.
